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“The most exquisite Folly is made of Wisdom spun too fine.”
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INTRODUCTION
At best, the Electoral College, utilized in the election of the President of the United
States, is widely misunderstood; at worst, it is downright mistrusted.2 The United States
Constitution assigns to “Electors” from each state the right and responsibility of casting the
actual votes, thus electing the President and Vice President.3 Article II allows each respective
state to determine how it appoints its Electors.4 Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia
have enacted statutory provisions that appoint their Electors on a Winner-Takes-All (WTA)
basis, whereby the political party of the candidate receiving the most popular votes within the
state selects that state’s Electors.5
2

See Art Swift, American’s Support for Electoral College Rises Sharply, GALLUP (Dec. 2, 2016)
https://news.gallup.com/poll/198917/americans-support-electoral-college-rises-sharply.aspx. Attitudes towards the
Electoral College have changed over the years, from an all-time high approval rating of 80% in 1968, to 2016’s
47%. However, lawsuits challenging the current electoral college indicate a growing distrust of the system. See
Lyman v. Baker, 352 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D. Mass. 2018).
3

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. It should be noted that in addition to the Electors’ right to vote for the President, the
Constitution implicitly assigns to Electors the nominating power. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
4

See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 n.18 (1983) (noting constitutional delegation of presidential
Elector selection to states); Christopher Anglim, A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the Electoral College: Its
Creation, History, and Prospects for Reform, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 297, 299 (1993) (describing wide discretion given to
states in appointing Electors).
5

See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 148 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-13-301
(West 2018) (codifying respective states’ WTA provisions); NAT’L ASSOC. OF SEC’YS OF STATE, SUMMARY: STATE
LAWS REGARDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS (2016), https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/201708/research-state-laws-pres-electors-nov16.pdf (cataloging states’ various Elector laws). Accordingly, the vote of
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Under the WTA scheme, the political party of the presidential and vice presidential
candidates who win the most popular votes in a state is awarded all of that state’s Electors.6 This
is the case regardless of whether—for example—the party’s candidates garner only 41.9% of the
popular vote and only 3,829 more votes than the next vote-getter in the state (as President
Ronald Reagan did in Massachusetts in 1980) or as much as 76.2% of the popular vote and as
many as 1,236,695 more votes than the next vote-getter in the state (as President Lyndon
Johnson did in Massachusetts in 1964).7 The WTA system thus effectively disenfranchises those
voters who vote for candidates other than those receiving the most votes in their state.
WTA also distorts presidential campaigns. Considering only a small margin of victory in
the popular vote in a state can deliver all of that state’s electoral votes, WTA necessarily leads
campaigns to focus on “battleground states” where the two major political parties each believe
their candidates can achieve popular vote victory for that year’s election.8 In fact, just four of the
2016 election’s battleground states (Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) saw 71%
of campaign advertising spending and 57% of candidate appearances.9 Moreover, the top
fourteen 2016 battleground states10 saw 99% of advertising spending and 95% of candidate
appearances.11 From this data, it is clear that WTA results in presidential campaigns routinely
turning focus away from tens of millions of citizens in non-battleground states such as
Massachusetts. WTA effectively incentivize candidates for President and Vice President to give
disproportionate attention to an unrepresentative subset of the country, ultimately providing that
every citizen voting for a candidate other than the leading candidate is rendered meaningless by receiving no Elector
representation directly or through a political party.
6

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 148; see also NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. ELECTORAL C., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html#wtapv
[https://perma.cc/DVP7-GPNC] (outlining Electoral College).
The District of Columbia and 48 states have a Winner-takes-all rule for the Electoral College. In
these states, whichever candidate receives a majority of the popular vote, or a plurality of the
popular vote (less than 50 percent but more than any other candidate), takes all of the state’s
electoral votes.
NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., supra.
7

See 1964 Presidential General Election Results-Massachusetts, DAVID LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&fips=25&year=1964 [https://perma.cc/JZ78-AL9J
] (showing 1964 Massachusetts presidential election results); 1980 Presidential General Election ResultsMassachusetts, DAVID LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&fips=25&year=1980 (showing 1980 Massachusetts presidential
election results).
8

See NONPROFIT VOTE, AMERICA GOES TO THE POLLS 2016: A REPORT ON VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2016 ELECTION
12 (2017), https://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2017/03/america-goes-polls-2016.pdf/
[https://perma.cc/SA4F-26PN].
9

See CANDIDATES MAKE LAST DITCH AD SPENDING PUSH ACROSS 14-STATE ELECTORAL MAP (2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/graphics/2016-presidential-campaign-tv-ads/, (breaking down both candidate’s
ad spending in fourteen states during the 2016 election).
10

See id. The 2016 battleground states collectively included only 35% of eligible voters; they were Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
11

See id. at 7, 12.
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unrepresentative subset outsized political influence. Under such circumstances, the presidential
election does not reflect or include the voices of millions across the entire nation.
Despite current sentiment to the contrary, it is the WTA system, not the Electoral College
itself, that plagues the health of our body politic. Section I of this Article begins first by
providing the necessary historical discussion of the Framers’ debates over the mode12 of
presidential selection that resulted in the use of presidential Electors.13 It identifies five core
principles by which every mode was measured, determining these constitutional priorities that
governed the decisions.14 Next, section I of this article will recount the history behind the first
four presidential elections, where the manner of elector necessitated the introduction of the
Twelfth Amendment.15 Section II will explore the language and purpose of the Twelfth
Amendment.16 Next, section II of this Article argues that history does not mandate the usage of
WTA, and in fact, supports the argument that WTA is antithetical to our constitutional origins.17
After detailing the constitutional history of presidential elections and WTA, that the WTA
system results in problems that may amount to violations of the constitutional requirements of
the mode of presidential selection, and the Twelfth Amendment.18 Finally, section III of this
proposes, by statistical analysis of the last several elections, that the best remedy to these ills is
not to kill the Electoral College—with a national popular vote or otherwise—but to put WTA to
rest.19 The replacement to WTAs, as a matter of federalism theory and practical consequence, is
what these authors have termed the “Proportional Elector Manner.”
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE MODE OF PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
By the accounts of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, the United States
Constitution did not simply reflect ideas generated and refined by its Framers during the
Constitutional Convention, but rather synthesized those policies and practices already at work in
the constitutions of the states and other countries.20 The convention debates, the Federalist
Papers, and the Framers’ correspondence reveal that these fifty-five men turned their attention to
a wide variety of complex issues. Yet, throughout their debates, in their decisions, and during
their drafting, the Framers remained focused on certain key principles to simplify and clarify the
federal system of government that they were building. All these focused on the transcendent

12

For the purposes of this Article, we define a “mode” as a means of presidential selection, and a “manner” as a
means of Elector appointment.
13

See infra Section II.A (discussing historical background of proposed presidential election modes).

14

See infra Parts II.A.1-5.

15

See infra Part II.B.1.

16

See infra Part II.B.2.

17

See infra Part III.A (arguing constitutional history opposes WTA use).

18

See infra Part III.B (making legal arguments to WTA).

19

See infra Section IV (outlining “Proportional Elector Manner”).

20

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 211-12 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1991) (describing state
constitutional values implemented in creation of Federal Constitution); JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 218 (Ohio Univ. Press, 1966) [hereinafter MADISON’S JOURNAL] (comparing
foreign governments to state systems).
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goals of preserving liberty for all and preventing tyranny by any.21 These lofty ideals manifested
in elaborate systems and structures—sometimes deliberately inefficient—but often decidedly
effective in preserving, protecting, and defending the Framers’ avowed ambition “to form a more
perfect union.”22
The federal government splits power with those granted to individual state governments
and its own delegated enumerated powers.23 The structure of the national government
correspondingly reflected three forms of republican character. First: directly, by deriving “all its
powers . . . from the great body of the people”24—namely by electing Representatives by
popular vote. Second: indirectly, by electing Senators by state legislative appointment. Finally,
by “a very compound source” specifically by electing the President through the Electors of the
several states, acting “partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the
same society.”25 The Framers intended these separate sources of power to assure the
independence of each branch of government.26 These principles informed the Framers’ debates
and decisions on virtually all topics, and influenced their drafting of virtually all provisions.
Before addressing WTA specifically, this Article first reviews the modes of presidential
selection debated by the Framers, focusing specifically on those considerations that played a key
role in the Framers’ decision that the Electoral College was a “more perfect” compromise.
The process of electing the President and Vice President has changed substantially since
the first election, but the current process retains some (but certainly not all) of the characteristics
thought important by the Framers.27 That said, the Framers’ debates remain informative given

21

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654-55 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (synthesizing
the essence of U.S. government is to “leave to live by no man’s leave.”). Id. at 654.
22

U.S. CONST. pmbl.

23

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 211 (James Madison) (identifying balance of state sovereignty and
republican representation); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
24

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 209 (James Madison).

25

See id. at 210, 212.

26

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 311-12 (quoting James Madison) “If it be essential to the
preservation of liberty that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers be sparate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other.” Id. at 311.
27

See JAMES W. CEASAR, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 42 (1979) (discussing theory
behind popular election). Originally, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution required electors to be proportioned by
a state’s number of representatives and senators. Each elector was given two votes, one of which had to be cast for a
candidate from outside the elector’s state. If there was a tie above the majority threshold, the House would pick
from the tied candidates. If there was a tie below the majority threshold, the House would consolidate
representatives by state, give each state a vote, and require a majority of those votes to select a winner. Id. at 42-43
n.1. Much of this was superseded by the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804. See L. PAIGE WHITAKER
& THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30804, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN OVERVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS at 2 (2004) http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30804.pdf. Since that
time, the closest Congress has come to changing the mode of presidential selection was during the 91st Congress,
when House Judiciary Resolution 681 proposed the direct election of the President and Vice President, requiring a
runoff when no candidate received more than 40% of the vote. The resolution passed the House in 1969 but failed
to pass the Senate. See id. at 18.
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their extended consideration of the topic.28 The Framers knew that the mode of presidential
selection must come from “some existing authority under the National or States Constitutions, by
some special authority derived from the people, or by the people themselves.”29 The Framers
consequently explored five principal modes of selection: by the national legislature, by state
executives, by state legislatures, by national popular vote, and by state-chosen Electors.30
In ultimately adopting the Electoral College, the Framers sought to incorporate both
national and federal interests, simultaneously respecting the independent sovereignty of the states
and reflecting the delegated powers of the national government.31 Additionally, maintaining the
independence of the Executive was among the Framers’ principal concerns.32 In turning to a
review of the debated modes of section, it is helpful to keep in mind that, as James Madison
opined, one of the Constitution’s core aims is to elect leaders “who possesses most wisdom to
discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good.”33
A. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
We are particularly fortunate that the Framers widely and exhaustively discussed the
mode of presidential election.34 From these debates and discussions, we can distill the principles
with which the Framers were concerned in ultimately deciding upon the Elector mode.
Ultimately, the use of Electors appeared the least susceptible to tyranny and the most

28

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 362-66 (quoting James Madison). James Wilson characterized the
mode of presidential selection as the most difficult that they were tasked to decide. See id. at 578.
29

Id. at 363 (quoting James Madison).

30

Some modes derived from these authorities were not considered, except in passing. See id. at 363 (quoting
Madison saying selection by judiciary “presumed … out of the question”). “The State [Judiciaries] had [not been,
and he] presumed [would not be,] proposed as a proper source of appointment.” Id. at 365. Proposed modes varied
widely, with some seeking to incorporate a lottery system. Id. at 359, 370–71. There was pushback against leaving
the appointment up to chance. Id. at 362.
31

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 212 (James Madison).
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of
the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them
are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as
unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch
of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to
be thrown into the form of individual delegations from so many distinct and coequal bodies
politic.

Id.
32

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 46-47 (discussing Randolph, Wilson, and Madison opinions on
presidential independence). Some of the Framers recognized that the mode of selection for the president depended
heavily on those powers delegated to the Executive, and those checks on the office thereof. See id. at 582-84.
33
34

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 20, at 318 (James Madison).

See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 16 (U. of Chi. Press 2004). The mode of selection is objectively one of the most
thoroughly covered topics within Madison’s Journal, however many scholars point out that the journal itself only
accounts for 10% of each day’s total discussions. See id. at 15.
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preservative of liberty.35 Studying these debates allowed us to identify those values the Framers
required of the presidential selection process. This Article now attempts to identify those
principles the Framers deemed important in selecting the president,36 and then analyzes WTA
considering these values to see how this manner measures up against those principles the
Framers ultimately identified as important.37
1. THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST CONTAIN FACTIONALISM
The Framers required any mode of presidential selection to prevent factionalism from
seizing the engine of governance. Gouverneur Morris explained how a special purpose body of
Electors was superior to a standing legislative body, because it avoided: “the danger of intrigue
and faction”—as was expected in any legislature.38 Hamilton described these “factions” as:
“[A] number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”39 Reasonably, one
such faction that falls under Hamilton’s definition was voter’s state allegiance.40 Madison noted
weighty difficulties remained, which unquestioningly reflected his presumption that individuals
would self-identify at the state level, perhaps standing above having a unified national interest or
unquestioning fidelity to a national government.41 Enduring state identification would likely
have resulted in the “disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State,” which
would necessarily disadvantage small states.42
Charles Pinckney found popular elections to be vulnerable to the will of “a few active
and designing men” who might assume leadership over each state’s election, and that more wellpopulated states might collude to advance their own shared priorities, even when not consistent
with the national interest.43 Oliver Ellsworth also concluded that Madison’s view was
“unanswerable,” with the largest states’ citizens’ invariably preferring in-state candidates and the
largest states “invariably hav[ing] the man.”44

35

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 20, at 223 (James Madison) (reflecting on choosing the greater, not the
perfect, good).
36

Infra Part II.A.1-5.

37

Infra Part III.A.1-5.

38

MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 576-77 (indicating reasoning for special purpose of body of Electors).

39

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 46 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).

40

See id. at 50 (describing faction from “local prejudices”).

41

MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 364-65 (quoting James Madison). Perhaps aiming to disprove his own
(widely shared) point by his actions, Madison suggested that “he was willing to make the sacrifice” of dealing with
the near-term consequences of certain proposed uniform electoral mechanics that, given then-prevailing regional
differences in democratic practices and population demographics, disadvantaged his state, which was both Southern
and large. See id. at 365-66. There is no record that his actions influenced the thinking of any of his fellow Framers
on the question of direct popular election.
42

Id. at 365 (quoting James Madison).

43

Id. at 307 (quoting Charles Pickney).

44

Id. at 366 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth).
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There also existed another factional “difficulty … of a serious nature.”45 This difficulty
was that with, for example, a direct popular national vote, the Southern States “could have no
influence in the election” given that their eligible voter populations were significantly smaller
than those of the Northern States.46 Madison diagnosed this problem as arising out of pragmatic
circumstances, notwithstanding the underlying moral complexities. In modern terms, while all
states limited voting by gender, the Southern states further constrained voting by restricting
voting rights by socioeconomic class and denying voting rights by race.47 Madison did not
address the moral aspect of this challenge, simply noting that the “substitution of electors
obviated this difficulty.”48 In pursuit of uniting the states, Madison and the other Framers
protected the Southern States against any adverse consequences from their in-state
discriminatory voting practices, which some of the Southern States long thereafter continued
with legacy manifestations to the present. But, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, this
was simply a political reality if any union—much less a more perfect one—were to be formed at
all.
2. THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST BE RESISTANT TO POPULAR EXCITEMENT
One of the common themes to the Constitution—and a tenet of republican
representation—was that decisions ought to be made divorced of populist emotions.49 The
Framers understood the power of populism and feared the power of the Executive in the hands of
what they called a “demagogue,” namely a political leader who gained power through exciting
passion and intrigue in the people.50 Protecting against demagogues was an imperative for the
presidential election no matter which mode was ultimately chosen. In Federalist No.10,
Alexander Hamilton explained how proportional representation was meant to be a buffer
designed to “aggregate [the] interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the
State legislatures.”51 Hamilton argued that an elected representative of a district serves as “a
medium of the chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest in their

45

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 327 (quoting James Madison).

46

See id. (quoting James Madison).

47

See id. (quoting James Madison). “The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the
Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the [black population.]” Id.
48

See id. (quoting James Madison).

49

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 235 (quoting Gouverneur Morris stating the “people never act from
reason alone”).
50

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 20, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing demagogues).
Demagogues . . . flatter the public, and . . . stoke division, anger and resentment. Demagogues
promise that they will restore lost glories and make everything right again. They divert the
public's attention to enemies and scapegoats within and without the republic. They divide the
public in order to conquer it. They play on people's fears of loss of status. They use divisive
rhetoric to distract attention, maintain a loyal set of supporters, and keep themselves in power.

Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147, 152 (2017).
51

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 51 (James Madison).
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country.”52 The mechanisms of the Constitution were designed so that true leaders of virtue
would materialize on a national stage.53
The safety mechanism to prevent such abuse is having the appropriate size of districts
within the election.54 Hamilton explained that by using representatives to represent districts in a
larger scheme acts as a means to quarantine those factions of “sinister designs” that have taken
hold of their electorate.55 When choosing the appropriate size of a district, on one hand, a district
must be small enough that the representative is “acquainted with all their local circumstances and
lesser interests.”56 On the other hand, the district must be large enough “to comprehend and
pursue great and national objects.”57 Containing representation to a Republican mode “renders
factious combinations less to be dreaded.”58 Indeed, Hamilton anticipated this quarantine model
in the context of a district to that of the larger, national scheme, when he said:
[When] you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other.59
If such a demagogue were to rise to power in one district, his or her metaphorical
sickness was difficult to spread to another, and it would take overwhelming support during an
election of other such demagogues of the same nature to acquire power.60 Even if a demagogue
were to capture the support of numerous districts, the quarantining quality of effective districting
would inoculate the remaining electorate.
3. THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST ENSURE EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENCE
The Framers in general, and Hamilton in particular, identified the necessity of executive
independence from the influence of the other two branches of government.61 Imbued with
federalist philosophy, the Framers perceived a close relationship between national and state
52

See id. at 50 (emphasis added).

53

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 20, at 318 (James Madison).

54

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 46-57 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
Gouverneur Morris disagreed that “a few designing men” might influence the vote by their “activity and intrigues,”
except in “a small district.” MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 2020, at 307-08. He proclaimed “[i]t can never
happen throughout the continent” that “those little combinations and those momentary lies, which often decide
popular elections within a narrow sphere” might influence a national election. Id. Morris ultimately doubted that
collusive and combined action in and by populous states might arise from an at-large election with nearly the same
likelihood that it might arise from elections by the state legislatures. Id. (quoting Gouverneur Morris).
55

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 50-51 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).

56

See id. at 51 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).

57

See id.

58

See id.

59

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 51 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).

60

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 307–08 (quoting Gouverneur Morris describing the “quarantine”
ability of effective districting).
61

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 380-81 (Alexander Hamilton).
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legislatures, just as they saw an intertwined dynamic between the national legislature and the
national executive. Achieving this balanced structure required that the legislative branch have
the power to impeach the executive for his “incapacity, negligence, or perfidy.”62 But with this
remedy came risk; there was concern that giving the legislature both the power to appoint and
remove the President might make the executive its “mere creature.”63 If the President was too
weak, the legislature could “usurp” the executive’s powers; but if the President was given too
much power, the legislature could have been rendered meaningless.64 In the words of
Gouverneur Morris, either “legislative tyranny” or an “elective monarch” might arise from an
unbalanced structure.65
The Framers engaged in extensive discussion at the Convention about the possibility of
the national legislature selecting the President.66 But they ultimately rejected this approach as
inconsistent with several of the Framers’ key principles, including separation of powers among
the branches and the allocation of power between states and the national government. Keeping
legislative and executive powers separate was an “indispensable necessity” for the Framers.67
Even with this check in place, it remained “the most difficult of all rightly to balance the
Executive.”68
These two perspectives together led the Framers to reject executive selection by state
legislatures. As the national legislature was meant to control the “strong propensity [of state
legislatures] to a variety of pernicious measures,” so too the national executive “was to control
the National Legislature, so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity.”69 As with
selection by the national legislatures, so too with state legislatures–the risk endured that larger
states might routinely prevail over smaller states.70 Aside from separation of powers concerns,
Madison expressed two practical concerns about legislative selection. First, he was concerned
this mode would “agitate [and] divide” the legislature and cause the public interest to “materially
suffer.”71 There was also concern that legislative selection of the President might render the veto
power72 meaningless, as the legislature might appoint someone who it knew would not exercise

62

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 332 (quoting James Madison).

63

See id. at 56 (quoting George Mason); see also id. at 327 (quoting James Madison positing “free agency” of
executive from legislatures deemed “essential”).
64

MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 327.

65

See id. at 525-26 (quoting Gouverneur Morris); see also id. at 136-37 (anticipating fears of Executive becoming
“elective monarch”).
66

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 367 (quoting Gouverneur Morris).

67

Id. at 577 (quoting Elbridge Gerry).

68

Id. at 361 (quoting Gouverneur Morris).

69

Id. at 364 (quoting James Madison).

70

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 366 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth); id. at 368-69 (quoting John
Dickinson).
71

See id. at 363 (quoting James Madison).

72

This is the only check on presidential power expressly authorized under Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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this necessary check on the House.73 Others expressed reserve that this mode of selection would
likely beholden the executive to the larger states.74
Ultimately, the selection of the President by either the state legislators, Governors, or
national legislature was rejected for its propensity to degrade the independence of the
executive.75 Hamilton believed that the nature of a detached person, without a position of trust
or profit, for the sole purpose of selecting the President, would help insulate the executive from
bribery or corruption.76 His writings identify how such separation protected appointment:
[The Electors] have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any
preexisting bodies of men who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute
their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the
people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and
sole purpose of making the appointment.77
4. THOSE WHO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST KNOW OF THE CANDIDATE’S QUALITIES.
The Elector system was largely intended to serve as an extension of republican
representation of the people for the sole purpose of selecting the President.78 It thus appears that
one of the driving considerations in the use of Electors appeared to be the availability of
information to help voters make such an important decision.79 Many of the Framers doubted the
abilities of the people to even obtain the necessary information to make an informed decision.80
For example, as a second basis for supporting Madison’s view that state-centric concerns might
dictate voters’ choices in a popular election, Roger Sherman posited that the people at large were
not capable of being “sufficiently informed of [the leading] characters.”81 George Mason
expressed this sentiment more starkly, asserting that the people might no more chose “a proper
character for” President than a blind man might pass “a trial of colours.”82
73

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 363-64 (quoting Madison); see also id. at 325-26 (quoting Edmund
Randolph).
74

See id. at 325-26 (suggesting that legislative selection might occur either by joint ballot by both houses or by
nomination by the lower house and appointment by the upper house); see also id. at 94 (quoting David Brearly’s
identification of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia as larger states).
75

See id. at 322, 325 (describing dangers of proposed appointment by state executives); supra note 63 and
accompanying text (describing danger of appointment by national legislature); supra note 69 and accompanying text
(describing danger of appointment by state legislature).
76

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton).

77

See id.

78

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 368-69 (quoting John Dickinson). “Let the people of each State
choose its best Citizen. The people will know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the people of
different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud.” Id.
at 369.
79

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing Elector more likely to “possess
the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations”).
80

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 306 (quoting Roger Sherman).

81

Id.

82

Id. at 308 (quoting George Mason).

Vol. 9.1

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

15

Gouverneur Morris took the opposite view, believing that “[i]f the people should elect,
they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some man, if he
might so speak, of continental reputation.”83 Even when acknowledging that “the multitude will
be uninformed,” Morris theorized that the people would know “of those great [and] illustrious
characters which have merited their esteem & confidence.”84 Morris categorically linked
accomplishment to fame, concluding “[i]t cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently
distinguished himself to merit this high trust without having his character proclaimed by fame
throughout the Empire.”85
However, skepticism won the day, and this priority was one of the driving forces to
ensure the use of Electors to be appointed in some fashion. Before the popularization of
selection of Electors by general vote, appointment of Electors by state legislators was a popular
choice amongst states for this exact reason, as most voters understood their vote for their state
legislator to actually be a vote for the President.86 This particular concern, brought up at most
mentions of the National Popular Vote (“NPV”), was one of the principle reasons that the NPV
mode was denied.
5. THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE’S
WILL
The Framers settled on the Elector mode because it embodied the truest balance between
direct representations of the people whilst simultaneously preventing human error. According to
Hamilton,
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention;
which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as
Electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the
national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit
person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of
the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of
the whole number of votes will be the President.87
The system of federal representation—having a balance between the House and the
Senate—was created to simultaneously balance the will of the people in their capacity as citizens
of the nation as a whole and their interests as members of a sovereign state.88 Madison himself
realized that the purpose of Electoral College was represent those dual interests in the
presidential elections.89 The college was designed not to interpose its will or change the choice
of the people; the evidence of rigorous debate in support of the NPV is evidence of this idea’s
83

Id. at 306 (quoting Gouverneur Morris).

84

Id. at 308 (quoting Gouverneur Morris).

85

Id. at 324 (quoting Gouverneur Morris).

86

See infra note 94 (explaining voting population’s understanding state representatives appointed Electors).

87

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).

88

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654-55 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (describing
American government system).
89

See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 464 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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importance.90 By implication, it reveals that when the vote of the people was changed by the
college, which has happened five times in history, there ought to be a danger that the college was
systemically curing.
B. WTAS AND THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT
1. THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE II
Understanding of the Twelfth Amendment starts with understanding the language of
Article II.
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two
persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves. . . . The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an
equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then
from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner choose the
President. . . . In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having
the greatest number of votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if
there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose
from them by ballot the Vice President. 91
The original Article II system allowed Electors to nominate and select two individuals for
President, requiring that one vote be cast for a candidate not from their own state.92 However,
the Electors were not permitted to cast their vote specifically for the President or Vice, but rather
choose the two candidates believed best qualified to serve.93 At its heart, this Electoral system
was designed to select the fittest candidate, but also served as a means to proportionally protect
those smaller states with fewer Electors.94 However, the deficiencies of this troublesome twovote Elector, lying just below the surface of the elections of 1789 and 1792, would rear its ugly
head in 1796 and 1800.95 Combined with a rise in Democratic Republican party power, those
latter hotly contested elections would eventually birth the Twelfth Amendment.
After the return of the 1790 census, Congress passed a law to proportionally assign the
states their Congressional representation and number of Electors.96 At this time, the states were

90

E.g. Norman R. Williams, Why The National Popular Vote Compact Is Unconstitutional, 2012 BYU L. REV.
1523, 1523 (2012); Stanley Chang, Recent Development: Updating The Electoral College: The National Popular
Vote Legislation, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 205, 216 (2007).
91

U.S. CONST. art II., § 1 (describing original presidential selection process).

92

See CEASAR, supra note 27, at 79-80 (discussing mechanisms of original Article II language).

93

See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 140 (1994).
94

See id. at 140.

95

See id. at 108.

96

See id. at 53.
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divided between those appointing their Electors and those allowing the people to vote for them.97
In the case of appointed Electors, state legislators were seen as expressing the preference of the
people in choosing presidential Electors.98
The election of 1796, however, revealed the insufficiency of this electoral procedure.
The rift between Federalists, now slipping from power, and Republicans brought forth calls for
party “faithful, not independent and maverick, [E]lectors.”99 The Electors’ strategic
maneuvering resulted in their voting for the candidate of their choosing, and “scattering” their
second vote amongst thirteen other candidates to bolster their actual choice.100 These practices
led to the presidency of John Adams, with Thomas Jefferson as Vice President.101 The election
of 1796 “sow[ed] the seeds of division between Jefferson and Burr and between Hamilton and
Adams” that would reap the whirlwind of 1800.102
A “complete mess” most aptly describes the election of 1800. New York proved to be
the most important battleground state, as it had WTAs in place for its appointed Electors.
Republicans diligently and successfully ran their campaigns because they understood state
legislators as the key to obtaining Electors.103 Aaron Burr began his campaign in New York City
with a star-studded presidential ticket.104 Sensing a Federalist defeat in New York, Alexander
Hamilton attempted to change Elector selection from legislative appointment to a district voting
process in a deal with the governor, a move viewed by most as less-than-scrupulous.105
Problems arose when Hamilton characterized this tactic as trying to change the rules of the game,
and “take what they had not won.”106 Adams and Hamilton, attempting to place their thumbs on
the scales, harmed Federalists irreparably nationally.107 Federalist Electors, sensing their defeat,
threw Electoral votes to Republican Aaron Burr to trigger a tie between the two Republican
frontrunners.108 Federalists knew that in the event of a tie, Article II directed that the House of
Representatives elect the president.109 Republicans accused the Federalists’ support of Burr as “a
defeat of the Election & usurpation of the Government by some creature whom they intend to
97

See id. at 54-55, 110.

98

See TADAHISA KURODA, supra note 93 at, 83-84, 86.

99

Id. at 69.

100

Id. at 70.

101

See id. at 70.

102

See id. at 72.

103

See TADAHISA KURODA, supra note 93 at, 84.

104

See id. at 84.

105

See id. at 85.

106

See id. at 86.

107

See id. at 91.

108

See id. at 97-98. James Madison had anticipated this exact problem with the original mode of presidential
selection during the Constitutional Convention. See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 368 (discussing various
voting mechanisms).
109

See U.S. CONST. art. II. Jefferson and Burr had each received 73 votes, with 65 to Adams, 64 to Pinckney, and 1
to Jay. See KURODA, supra note 94, at 102 (noting that the House was then only able to proceed balloting for
Jefferson and Burr after this count).
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designate by law.”110 Despite Federalist attempts to supplant the national support of the
Republicans, Congress elected Jefferson as President on their 36th attempt.111
This history provides us with the essential context to understand why the Eighth
Congress sought to correct the Constitution’s course by proposing the Twelfth Amendment.112
By 1801, the Constitution clearly contained two large weaknesses in the mode of presidential
selection.113 First, the Electors could use their votes to manipulate the Article II system, as seen
in both 1796 and 1800. Despite the people’s preference, Electors’ vote manipulation failed to
“transmit” the vote of the people, as commanded by Article II. Corruption in the manner of
selecting the Electors also presented itself as a problem.114 At the time, the choice for selecting
Electors was boiled down to two options: legislative appointment or popular election, the latter
further subdivided into elections in districts or general tickets.115 The second concern demanded
an amendment needed to “prevent state legislators from setting aside the clear wishes of the
majority of the people.”116 The Twelfth Amendment answered this call by seeking to
fundamentally protect the effective participation of the people in the presidential election
process.
2. THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT ENTERS
The text of the Twelfth Amendment states, in relevant part:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President
and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same
state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as
President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons
voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the
United States, directed to the President of the Senate.117
The history of the first four elections revealed problematic political maneuvering on the
part of the Electors. To solve this political maneuvering problem, the Twelfth Amendment
110

See KURODA, supra note 93, at 101. It is important to note that this is a drastic oversimplification of the election
of 1800. Entire books have been written on the subject, however, understanding these basic facts are essential to
understanding what the Twelfth Amendment was written to fix.
111

See id. at 105.

112

See id. at 127.

113

See id. at 114. Of all the vast disagreements between Federalists and Republicans, this was common ground that
both sides could find. Madison himself admitted that the mode had failed the charge of the Constitution, and that an
amendment was needed. See id. at 113.
114

See KURODA, supra note 94, at 113 (indicating that after an aristocratic has won, suffrage rights were deprived).

115

See id. (noting that Jefferson wanted to keep his party’s options open).

116

Id. at 114. Proponents of the Twelfth Amendment believed that the Framers, some of them still living and
involved in the disastrous elections, were clear in their intent. “Wise and virtuous as were the members of the
Convention, experience has shown that the mode therein adopted cannot be carried into operation; for the people do
not elect a person for an [E]lector who, they know, does not intend to vote for a particular person as President.” Id.
at 120.
117

See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

Vol. 9.1

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

19

required each elector to submit one vote for President, and one for Vice President, instead of the
Electors selecting their top two choices for President.118 The Twelfth Amendment guaranteed
that the states could choose their mode of selecting Electors so long as the Electors
“represent[ed], in a certain proportion, both the nation and the states.”119 Detractors rightly
contested that the heart of the Constitution did not revolve around the will of the majority.120
However, the Twelfth Amendment did not mandate majority will, but allowed states to decide
their priorities in the interests of the states and the people when choosing a manner of selection.
By securing the states’ right to choose the mode of selecting Electors, the Twelfth Amendment
preserved the dueling interests of the states and the nation, guaranteeing effective participation in
the Presidential process.121
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MODERN WTAS
A. WTAS VIOLATE THE HISTORICAL VALUES OF PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION
The Constitution did not create WTA; it simply gave permission to states to create these
laws.
The use of WTAs began to catch on after the election of 1796, when Jefferson lost the
election largely due to the strategic “scattering” of the Electors.123 In fact, if Virginia and North
Carolina, both largely supportive of Jefferson, had a WTA system in place, Jefferson would have
won the presidency.124 By 1824, all of the states had adopted state-wide WTAs, a tradition
which has continued until today.
122

The use of WTAs results in two trends that entirely define the modern presidential
election process.125 First, WTAs create two classes of states in the context of a presidential
election: “battleground states” and “spectator states.” These “battleground states” are
reasonably defined as those states carrying the possibility of awarding their Electoral votes to
either the Democratic or Republican candidate.126 In 2016, 94% of all campaign events took
place in twelve key states.127 In 2012, campaigns purchased 96.2% of all political television
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See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. A secondary function was to foster a unified party ticket, moving votes from
individuals to parties. See CEASAR, supra note 27, at 104.
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See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

120

See KURODA, supra note 94, at 150.
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See id. at 113-14.
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See Anglem, supra note 4, at 299 (describing states’ freedom in choosing Electors).
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See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (describing election of 1796).
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See Devin McCarthy, How the Electoral College Became Winner-Take-All, FAIRVOTE (Aug. 21, 2012),
https://www.fairvote.org/how-the-electoral-college-became-winner-take-all (recounting election of 1796).
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See Craig J. Herbst, Note, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with the DistrictPopular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 233-34 (2012) (explaining how WTAs create “battleground states” and
“spectator” states”).
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See A Recent Voting History of the 15 Battleground States, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/voting-history-of-the-15-battleground-states (describing battleground or swing
states in America).
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NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, Two-thirds of Presidential Campaign Is in Just 6 States, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016 (showing breakdown of 2016 campaign events).
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advertisement in ten battleground states.128 These battleground states regularly change their
behavior to preserve their status, often jockeying to move forward their primary date to increase
their relevance.129 In 2016, analysists identified fourteen states that could reasonably go to either
candidate.130 The remaining “spectator states” are those where their support is a foregone
conclusion. Second, WTAs entirely discard the votes of the losing party in Electoral College
representation, whereby 50.01% of a state’s votes translates to 100% of the state’s Electors
awarded to the winner. By these two consequences that we weigh five aforementioned
constitutional values against the historical constitutionality of modern WTAs.
1. WTAS ENABLE FACTIONALISM
By their nature, WTAs allow for factions that capture just over half of a state’s support to
claim all of its Electors. For example, the competing interests of slave states and those that did
not allow slavery proved one of the most important factions the Framers concerned themselves
with.131 To prevent this procedurally, the Framers created the two houses, the House of
Representatives protecting the interests of the more populous states, while the Senate balanced it
with equal votes to all states.132 Second, the Constitution created the Interstate Compact Clause,
forbidding any state from entering into an agreement with another state without the consent of
Congress.133 The Framers designed the Electoral College to address these issues by not only
framing the electoral system as a proportional vote, but guaranteeing a degree of independence
from otherwise political machinations. However, with slavery abolished, we find that new
categories of faction have emerged, namely states grouped as either conservative or liberal, and
grouped as either battleground or spectator.
The existence of two classes of states, alone appears contrary to the values expressed by
the Framers in the drafting of the Constitution. The thin margin of support separating the two
prevailing political parties creates a battleground state. As such, battleground states serve almost
128

See Nathaniel Peterson, The Geography of Campaign Spending, WRIGHT ST. U., https://liberalarts.wright.edu/applied-policy-research-institute/blog/article/the-geography-of-campaign-spending (mapping 2012
political television advertisement spending).
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See BROOKINGS, Event Summary: “Front Loading” the Primaries: The Wrong Approach to Presidential
Politics? (Jan. 14, 2004), BROOKINGS, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/event-summary-front-loading-theprimaries-the-wrong-approach-to-presidential-politics/ (describing “front loading” of state primaries).
130

See generally REAL CLEAR POLITICS, Battle for the White House, REAL CLEAR POL.,
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/2016_elections_electoral_college_map_race_changes.html
(mapping likelihood of states’ presidential preference). It is worth noting that Wisconsin, one of the most important
electoral wins for Donald Trump, was not listed as a battleground state, but as a likely Democratic win. Id.
131

See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (describing factions of slave and free states). The shameful “Three
Fifths” compromise of Article II is clear evidence of this divide. See U.S. CONST. art. II. Northern states were
concerned with the Southern states receiving greater representation within the federal government, and by
association presidential elections, by virtue of the number of their slaves. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
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See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

See Eric T. Tollar, Note, Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting From Ballot
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as microcosms of the national political conversation, but distill the electoral process into highstakes campaigns in only a limited number of states. The Framers, in their many discussions,
identified that the people were the “only legitimate fountain of power.”134 States have
continuously jockeyed over the last several years for earlier voting and primary dates in an effort
to stay relevant in the national conversation of presidential elections. Candidates know that
votes in Ohio and Florida matter far more than Massachusetts and Idaho; this disparate treatment
is detrimental to the rights of other citizens and defines this modern form of factionalism.
Battleground states—the direct result of WTAs—have become the very factions that the
Framers so feared and sought to avoid in their many debates and adjustments of the presidential
selection process. The abolishment of WTAs would undoubtedly result in the death of
battleground states altogether, and would cure the issue of factions.
2. WTAS ARE VULNERABLE TO EXCITEMENT AND DEMAGOGUES.
WTAs consolidate the outcome of a presidential election in only a handful of states,
removing the protection of the republican districting method. The Framers, in their genius,
designed voting districts to contain unbridled populism; however, the implementation of the
WTA system substantially weaken districting’s check on populism.
WTAs make a state vulnerable to a demagogue capturing a disproportionate amount of
presidential support. WTAs naturally produce high-stakes battleground states, and leave the rest
of the states as spectators.135 In the past six presidential elections, no candidate has succeeded
without capturing at least 62.5% of battleground states in the country.136 If a presidential
candidate can focus their energy to capitalize in battleground states, it would mean that a
disproportionate amount of states can impose their will on the entire nation.
3. WTAS WEAKEN EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENCE FROM STATE LEGISLATURES
The Framers clearly feared a President beholden to the political or personal interests of
the body that elected him.137 One of the greatest dangers the states saw in such a government
was that their interests would not be secured, and concerns not be addressed.138 However, just
like the individual must surrender some of their liberty within a Republican government, so too
must the states surrender some of their sovereignty to a federal government. 139
The Framers also knew that the legislatures and representatives of the states would be no
exception. The President must sign every bill brought forth by Congress, including
134

THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 281-82 (James Madison).
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See supra Part III.A.
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See A Recent Voting History of the 15 Battleground States, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
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(showing presidential outcomes from 1996-2012); 2016 Presidential Election Results, 270TOWIN,
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See THE FEDERALIST NO 2, supra note 20, at 5 (John Jay).
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appropriations bills. WTAs create a handful of battleground states that are disproportionally
essential to winning the presidency. It is not outside the realm of belief that if local politicians or
members of Congress would support a presidential candidate knowing that the President would
look fondly upon their state when the time came for federal appropriations. Spectator states have
far less to offer a presidential candidate, which could disadvantage them if a certain candidate is
victorious.
4. WTAS AND THOSE WHO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST KNOW OF THE CANDIDATE’S
QUALITIES.
During the course of the Constitutional Convention, Eldrige Gerry was the most
articulate in identifying the challenges and shortcomings of the people.140 Members of the
convention clearly distrusted the knowledge of the general voting population so much so that this
distrust alone was one of the greatest driving forces behind the defeat of the NPV.141
Technology has likely advanced in such a way that the Framers could not have imagined.
Most people today have access to the internet either through computers or smartphones. Social
media and widespread access to news raises the general base of knowledge of the electorate. At
best, the abolition of WTAs would increase the meaningful exchange of ideas in a wider base of
the electorate, and perhaps increase voter registration and turnout.
5. THE MODE TO SELECT SHOULD BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE’S WILL
The Framers knew that the mode of presidential selection must come from “some
existing authority under the National or States Constitutions—or by some special authority
derived from the people—or by the people themselves.”142 Quite simply, a republican form of
government provides that the people choose those representatives who in turn create the laws to
bind them.143 That simple system cannot be more indicative of the foundational concept of
liberty and tyranny. The people surrender a small portion of liberty to a duly elected
representative of government in order to prevent tyranny, organize for common defense and
interest and order, and promote order.144 While a branch of government may represent the
interests of a state or a group of people,145 the only “legitimate fountain of power” lies with the
people.146
At their core, WTAs transform 50.01% of the vote into the unilateral support of that same
state in the Electoral College. The Framers’ vision did not include this disregard of such a large
section of the voting population. Additionally, the near certainty of other states voting pattern
denies the voters in those states a meaningful voice in the presidential election process. Using
either the Maine and Nebraska Manner or the National Popular Vote would create negative
140

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 327 (reporting Gerry’s proposal that Governors ought to select
President due to distrust of general population).
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See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing fatal flaw of NPV).
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MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 363 (quoting James Madison).
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See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 211 (James Madison).
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See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 20, at 5 (John Jay).
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See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 supra note 20, at 209 (James Madison).
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See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 20, at 281 (James Madison).
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consequences for the presidential candidate that ignored the interests of the members of their
political party in spectator states. Providing a voice to the issues that voters in those states care
about is the exact reflection of the will of all the people that the Framers intended—not just the
will of the people in battleground states. Thus, this Article now proposes a new system that the
authors believe help remedy these constitutional concerns while comporting with the principles
the Framers identified as important in selecting the President. Regardless of the constitutionality
of the current WTA system, the proposed manner is one that would benefit our political system.
B. WTAS CONTRADICT THE MEANING OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT
The passage of the Twelfth Amendment addressed the main deficiencies in the current
elector system. This Article approaches understanding the Twelfth Amendment by two different
means. First, by looking to the history of the amendment, we can understand the purpose of its
passage and what deficiencies it intended to correct.147 Second, this Article interprets the text of
the amendment to understand the normal meaning of the words as understood in their original
usage. By eliminating Electors’ ability to scatter or misdirect their votes, the Eighth Congress
directed that Electors must “transmit” the votes of the people.148 Doing so ensured the Framers’
WTAs at best do not serve, and at worst violate, the central principles and text of the Twelfth
Amendment.
The Framers coalesced around the idea of balance. The Constitution thus guaranteed that
states gave the people in their individual capacities, in their capacities as citizens of a state, the
interests of smaller states, the interests of larger states, and the interests of regions effective
participation in presidential selection.149 The principle of effective participation simply states
that the people must have a voice within the election of a government official that represents
them.150 Before the widespread application of WTAs, that representation came in one of two
flavors. First, the people chose their state legislator with the understanding that their
representative would later choose presidential Electors that represented their interests. Second,
the people would choose an Elector who would do the same, either by general ticket or district
ticket. The Twelfth Amendment attempted to guarantee that the government heard the voice of
the people—including the minority—and that states counted and transmitted their votes.
WTAs undercut the principle of effective participation inherent in the Twelfth
Amendment. When a state’s citizens vote in presidential elections, they never provide
unanimous support for a candidate. However, if a minority voice garners enough support, they
should be able to secure a voice of representation in the process. Allowing a minority segment to
secure such representation forces candidates to at least listen to the concerns of this segment of
the electorate and respond accordingly. WTAs, by constructively disregarding any electoral
representation for the minority, allow candidates to ignore large, but nonetheless minority,
147

See supra Part II.B.1.

148

See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. This language was unchanged from the original text of Article II and was
specifically debated within the Constitutional convention. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also FEDERALIST NO. 68,
supra note 20, at 381-82 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing mandate of vote transmission).
149

See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 133 (quoting Alexander Hamilton discussing equality of suffrage
essential to effective government).
150

See cf., supra Section II.A.4 (explaining “consent of the governed”); see also cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
565 (1964) (acknowledging right of each citizen to “have an equally effective voice” in election process).
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segments of the voting population. This effectively eliminates the ability of those segments of
the electorate to have any meaningful influence in the selection of the President. Eliminating the
minority voice runs afoul of the Twelfth Amendment’s guarantee of effective participation.
The election of 1796 was decided by the party Electors’ unilateral support of one
candidate with their first vote, and the subsequent scattering of their remaining vote to dilute the
votes of their political opponents. Thus these Electors were not effectively voting at all, but
instead used their votes as partisan political maneuvering.151 The Twelfth Amendment intended
to transform the Elector from a “discretionary trustee” to a “bound agent” by requiring the
Electors to “transmit” the votes of the people.152 To understand the textual meaning of the word
“transmit,” this Article looks to a number of dictionaries written and used at the time that the
Amendment and the Constitution were written.153
Today the word “transmit” is defined as “to send or transfer (a thing) from one person to
another” or “to communicate.”154 Reading the word as it was defined in the time of the Framers
suggests that the word meant largely the same then as it does now. The Framers defined
“transmit” as “to fend155 from one person to another.”156 “Transmit” is also meaningfully used in
the definition of two words: “acquire” and “give.” “Acquire” is defined as “to gain by one’s
own labour or power; to obtain what is not received from nature, or transmitted by
inheritance.”157 “Give” is defined as “to transmit from himself to another hand, speech, or
writing; to deliver; to impart; to communicate.”158 A reading of these dictionaries written from
1755-1775 all conclude that “transmit” meant a transfer or communication that does not change
the original character of the object of meaning of the communication.
Looking at these varying definitions, WTAs certainly do not transmit the votes of a state.
For example, in 2016, 47.4% of Florida voters supported Hillary Clinton in the presidential
election, 48.6% supported Donald Trump.159 Yet, by merit of the WTA system, the Electors
reported Florida’s unanimous and unequivocal support for only the Republican candidate. The
story in 2016 was the same in almost every single state throughout the country. Indeed, the
151

See CEASER, supra note 27, at 104 (describing shortcomings of Second Amendment). In addition to the
scattering of votes, there were a number of different ways to spoil the votes of the majority. See id. For example,
the defeated party could realistically throw all of their votes to the majority’s second place candidate, making the
majority’s choice for Vice President win the election. See id.
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See id. at 136.
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See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77, 581 (2008). When interpreting the text of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court is “guided by the principle that the Constitution was written to be understood by the
votes; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 576 (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931). Following the model set forth by Justice Scalia, this Article uses dictionaries at
the time to determine the meaning of the word “transmit.” See id. at 581-82.
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Transmit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2018).
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Fend, 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 368 (1775) (defining fend
as “to keep off” or “to shift off a charge”).
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Transmit, 2 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 360 (2nd ed. 1775).
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Acquire, JOHNSON’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 75 (2nd ed. 1755).
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Give, JOHNSON’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 903.
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See infra app. E (showing national preference).
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WTA did not transmit the presidential preference of about 60% of states;160 instead, the WTA
distorted them to express unanimous support of a single candidate. WTA thus results in the
votes of the people being transmuted, not transmitted, by the Electors who represent them.161
Altering the preferences of the people of a state through WTAs thus violates the Twelfth
Amendment by transforming the votes of the people, not transmitting them.
IV. THE MORE PERFECT MANNER
There is no greater thrill than watching presidential election results; hearing the iconic
announcement: “We now call the state of Massachusetts and its eleven presidential Electors for .
. . .” Nevertheless, when we hear “its eleven Electors,” most do not understand that Electors
exist in two separate categories in every state. The structure of Electors largely mirrors
representation within the federal government: 1) the number of Electors proportional with that
states’ seats within the House of Representatives (District Electors), and 2) a statewide Elector
bonus of two Electors per state (Statewide Electors).162 District Electors, much like the House of
Representatives, represent the preference of the state’s popular vote. Statewide Electors, much
like the Senate, award Electors for winning the state and protect the interests of smaller states
when faced with the volume of votes in the larger states.
A. THE THREE ALTERNATIVE MANNERS
This Article contemplates three alternatives to WTAs: the Maine and Nebraska Manner
(MNM); the national popular vote (NPV); and our own invention, the Proportional Elector
Manner (PEM). This Article briefly explains each manner, and then proposes the PEM as the
best possible alternative.
1. THE MAINE AND NEBRASKA MANNER
Although states predominantly use the WTA manner of Elector appointment, the states of
Maine and Nebraska use a different system. Under the Maine and Nebraska Manner (MNM),
the plurality winner within each congressional district is allocated one Elector, with the plurality
winner state-wide allocated the final two. There is substantial merit to this approach, especially
for states with a large urban population concentrated in limited areas of the state and rural
communities extending across the remainder. New York, Texas, and California, perhaps the
most prominent examples, house some of the country’s largest cities.163 It is worth noting that
Maine and Nebraska are themselves strong examples of states without large urban populations
that benefit from the MNM.
160

See infra app. E (describing PEM). In 2016, under the proposed PEM, there would only have been fourteen
states (and D.C.) with unanimous support of a single candidate. See infra app. E. Using MNM, only sixteen would
have unanimously supported one candidate. See infra app. E.
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See 2 THOMAS SHERIDAN, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (1775)
(defining transmute as “to change from one nature or substance to another”).
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The District of Columbia is the only exception to this rule, as they have no representation within National
government, but in 1961, were afforded three presidential Electors. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. The calculation
for the District was difficult. For the purposes of presidential accounting, that the District of Columbia would be
counted as a state like Montana or Vermont, allocating one District Electors and two state-wide Electors. When
referring to “states” won overall, D.C. is included in those calculations.
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See Ten U.S. Cities Now have 1 Million People or More; California and Texas Each have Three of These Places,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 21, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-89.html
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The Framers, in the original debates concerning presidential selection, and the subsequent
debates over the Twelfth Amendment, considered, and even approved of, this manner.164 The
MNM currently employed by the two states of its namesake assigns the choice of each
congressional district that party’s presidential Elector, and the two Statewide Electors to the
overall vote-getter in the states. This manner provides for a tidy assignment of presidential
Electors by congressional district, and appears to be the fairest way to count the election.
Although a good idea, interference by bad actors is enough to spoil any system, including the
MNM. Indeed the MNM is susceptible to a consequent evil of political partisanship:
gerrymandering.
The Supreme Court—particularly in the 2018 term—struggled with developing a test for
identifying a politically gerrymandered district.165 For the sake of brevity, the authors decline—
just as the courts have—to set forth a repeatable test that may be employed to determine a
gerrymander has occurred.166 Nevertheless, for allegorical purposes, we can identify the issue
much as Justice Stewart did with pornography: “you know it when you see it.”167
In 2008, Obama won 53.4% of the NPV to McCain’s 46%.168 Nevertheless, WTA
inflated Obama’s victory considerably, assigning 365 Electors—67.8% of the college—to
Obama.169 The 2008 distribution of the District Electors narrowly departs the NPV; by district,
Obama wins 242 to McCain’s 194: 55.5% to 44.5%.170 Ultimately, both MNM and PEM
closely reflect the national and district-wide vote, and seem to more closely resemble reality than
WTA’s huge margin. However, the two systems’ accuracies drastically depart in 2012.
The MNM brings about troubling results when used to count the presidential votes in the
last two elections. President Obama’s incumbent victory in the 2012 election was less
comfortable defeating Mitt Romney in the NPV 51.4% to 47.6%.171 How then, did WTAs assign
61.7% to Obama and 38.29% to Romney?172 More importantly, how is it that the MNM would
actually have elected Mitt Romney as President over Barack Obama, 50.19% to 49.81% (270
164

See supra Parts III.A-B (summarizing history and debates over Twelfth Amendment).
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See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (declining use of efficiency gap test for partisan political
gerrymandering). The Supreme Court first created the test to determine that an unconstitutional gerrymander exists
with “evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of
voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.” See Davis v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).
However, the plurality in Vieth v. Jubelirer were unanimous only in their willingness to “jettison the test set forth in
Bandemer.” See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.Supp.3d 837, 877 (W.D. Wis.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018). In
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the Supreme Court ruled that the appellants had not provided a
reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional gerrymanders. 548 U.S. 399, 420-21, 423 (2006).
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See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926-29 (2018) (outlining history of Court’s adjudication of
gerrymandering claims).
167

See Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (characterizing pornography as
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See infra app. D.
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electoral votes for Romney and 268 to Obama), in the 2012 presidential election?173 The answer
is deceptively simple: a candidate’s success within the borders of a recently redrawn
congressional district did not correlate to the candidate’s success within a state.
Look at the historically conservative state of Alabama.174 In 2012, MNM’s accounting
would’ve broken out only one district (14.3% of the state’s total districts) for the Democratic
candidate and six districts for the Republican.175 How then does the vote count answer for
Obama receiving almost 40% of the popular vote?176 On the other side of the coin, the
historically liberal state of Massachusetts tells the same story. In 2012, MNM assigned no
Republican party victors in any of Massachusetts’s congressional districts.177 What explanation
can Massachusetts then offer for almost 40% of its state voting for Romney?178
The unfortunate truth is that the disparity between NPV results and Electoral College
results is the result of a bitter, national struggle over partisan consolidation of power. And if
such obvious disparities between congressional districts being awarded to a candidate and the
state’s overall preference is evidence of a wrongdoing, then in 2012, Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin all appear guilty.179 Indeed, “the fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
but in ourselves.”180 Unfortunately, the simplest explanation to account for such a drastic
disparity between statewide returns and congressional district victories between 2008 and 2012:
the 2010 census, redistricting, and gerrymandering.
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The MNM’s 2012 accounting of the presidential Electors would have been the second closest presidential
election of all time, the first being Benjamin Harrison’s 1888 win by a single electoral vote. See infra app. D
(showing 2012 MNM election results).
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See infra apps. A-E (showing Alabama choosing GOP candidates in past five elections).
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See infra app. D.
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See infra app. D (showing 38% of Alabama voters supporting Obama).
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See infra app. D.
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See infra app. D (showing 37% of Massachusetts voters supporting Romney).

179

See infra app. D. Acknowledging the seriousness of this claim, a decision was made to assign a numerical value
to identify the disparity. The study first identified the margin of victory between the two parties in the respective
congressional districts of each state. Then, it identified the margin of victory in the state-wide vote. Finally, it
determined the margin between the congressional and statewide margins of victory and referred to it as the
“discrepancy value.” Only states with four congressional districts or more were analyzed as states with three or less
congressional districts can exaggerate the discrepancy value. As a preliminary matter in 2012, Florida, Michigan,
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a discrepancy should be a cause for alarm for all voters regardless of political affiliation. Cf. Eric T. Tollar, Note,
Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting From Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
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Referencing the five most recent presidential elections, WTA is most guilty of inflating
the margin of victory on the national level.181 MNM appeared sound until states meddled in the
drawing of congressional district boundaries, and barring judicial intervention, the MNM system
does not provide sufficient protection from partisan interference from state legislatures in what is
a national interest.182 However, in the 2000 and 2016 elections, where the NPV disagreed with
the Electoral College, the PEM reveals itself to be the most accurate manner.
2. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE
Since the 2016 election, there has been an increasing trend to change election accounting
to be determined via the National Popular Vote. One proposal that is gaining momentum is an
interstate compact, adopted by some and pending in other states, that would become effective
once the adopting states collectively appoint a majority of the Electoral College.183 If adopted by
an interstate compact, the NPV would maintain the Electoral College but with the adopting states
pledging to allocate their Electors to whichever candidate won the NPV (including by a nonmajority plurality) regardless of the result in the state itself.184
If a constitutional amendment was adopted instead as a substitute for the Electoral
College, the NPV would constitute a direct democratic process in which the candidate with the
most votes wins the presidency. However, as a substitute for the Electoral College, the NPV
fatally suffers from the problems identified by the framers when they considered and rejected a
direct democratic process for selecting the President.185
Further, the NPV adopted by interstate compact presents additional challenges, at least as
presently contemplated. If, for example, a fractious candidate wins a plurality of votes nationally
but predominantly from one geographic, cultural, and political region, faring far less well in
many other regions (including those in the northeast and west coasts where many states have
already adopted the compact) then the peoples of the compact-adopting states will have
committed their Electors to vote for that candidate, whom they themselves had rejected.186
Indeed, the text of the Constitution, along with a plethora of historical evidence, command that
Electors, and not the direct vote of the people, shall choose the President.187 Without an
amendment to the Constitution, the NPV cannot be considered an acceptable alternative to WTA.
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See infra app. F (ranking WTA, MNM, and PEM accounting); infra note 204 (explaining in depth the
methodology of ranking test to determine overall accuracy).
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See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (declining to establish a test to determine political
gerrymandering). This author contends that the MNM would be wholly appropriate for some states. However, the
proverbial genie (i.e., gerrymandering) is out of the bottle in many others.
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3. THE PROPORTIONAL ELECTOR MANNER
Beyond finding constitutional deficiencies in WTA and practical difficulties with NPV,
this Article proposes an alternative to MNM: What these authors call the Proportional Elector
Manner (PEM). Using this accounting method, candidates are awarded District Electors
proportionally to each candidate based on the popular vote within the state. The Statewide
Electors are then awarded to the candidate in proportion to the state’s popular vote. Proportional
allocation of Electors is simple: the percentage of the popular vote each candidate wins is
divided by the number of District Electors available within the state. This number represents the
amount of District Electors that candidate will receive. While straightforward on its face, PEM
is still problematic as simple division does not yield whole numbers.
To address this issue, PEM proposes “Jury Elector” accounting. “Jury Elector”
accounting is designed to be a simple, commonsense rule: one may never “round up” an Elector
to a whole number.188 The runners-up in a state are awarded as many whole Electors as their
proportional vote earned them, and the state’s winner is awarded the remainder as a “bonus.”
For example, in 2016, Illinois had 18 District Electors and two Statewide Electors.189 Clinton
won 55.3% of the vote in 2016, Trump won 38.4%, Johnson took 3.8% and Stein took 1.4%.190
Dividing Illinois’ 18 Electors by Johnson’s percentage would yield 0.68 Electors, and Stein’s
percentage would account for 0.25 Electors.191 As neither candidate passes the threshold of 1.0,
they are awarded no Electors.192 Dividing Illinois’s 18 District Electors by the state’s loser,
Trump’s 38.4% of the vote comes to 6.91 Electors.193 As Jury Electors may not be rounded up,
this ultimately means that Trump is awarded six Electors, and the other two candidates receive
188

This “Jury Elector” system is developed from two different areas of law: jury satisfaction and the Constitution.
For example, in Montana, a civil trial is permitted with as few as six jurors. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,
149-151 (1973). Montana law provides that: “At least two-thirds in number of any jury may render a verdict or
finding, and such verdict or finding so rendered shall have the same force and effect as if all such jury concurred
therein.” MONT. CONST § 26 (emphasis added). Using simple division, two-thirds in the case of a jury of ten is 6.7
but would require rounding up to seven jurors to make a finding as 6.6 is less than two-thirds. Id. In the case of
“Jury Electors” our rationale to round down was grounded in equity of the political process. After all, the courts
generally disfavor complex mathematical calculations in the application of law. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at
37-38, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (criticizing complicated mathematical calculations
use in law). Second, it seems inequitable to allow candidate who receives 0.1 of a hypothetical Elector to be
awarded a whole Elector to the detriment of other legitimate candidates as such a method would lead to inaccurate
accounting results. Rather, by requiring that a candidate proportionally achieve at least one whole electoral vote, the
method keeps consistent with other areas of election law jurisprudence that require a candidate to make a showing of
substantial support in order to preserve the ballot for legitimate struggles. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983) (affirming a state’s right to require preliminary showing of substantial support for ballot
access); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 709 (1974) (declaring ballot restriction unreasonable to achieve state interest
of maintaining election’s integrity); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (affirming state interest in
protecting political process by candidate showing substantial support from electorate).
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none.194 While Clinton’s 55.3% only triggers nine Electors,195 the elegant solution is that the
victor takes the remaining Electors that the defeated candidates failed to capture. As such, we
award six District Electors to Trump proportionally, the 12 remaining Electors to Clinton
proportionally, and two Statewide Electors to the overall winner of Illinois: Clinton.196
Ultimately, this would mean six Electors for Trump, and 14 Electors for Clinton.197
B. PEM IS THE MOST ACCURATE MANNER OF ELECTOR APPOINTMENT
The object of an election is to reflect or transmit the will of the electorate.198 However,
the purpose of Electors is to represent two separate electoral interests: the state’s interests and
the people’s interest.199 The first of these is the will of the people as individuals; the second is to
ensure that the voters of smaller states are not ignored by the vast populations of the larger
states.200 District Electors are analogous to the interests of the people, much like the House of
Representatives, and Statewide Electors are analogous to the interests of the respective states,
much like the Senate.
This article sets about the task of answering a deceptively simple question: between the
PEM, MNM, and WTA manners, which most accurately reflected the will of the people?201
Considering the dueling interests of a presidential election,202 the authors compared the result of
each of the three manners against three different data points. The accuracy of each manner was
compared against the result of (1) the NPV,203 (2) the winner based on congressional district,204
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Infra app. E.
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Infra app. E. Clinton won exactly 9.95 electors proportionally, but Jury Elector accounting forbids rounding up.
See infra app. E.
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In an effort to determine which of the MNM, PEM, and WTA manners most accurately reflects the will of the
electorate, the authors calculated the outcome of the past five presidential elections if each of the three methods were
used. First, the authors determined the winner of the statewide vote for every state. They then determined the
margin by which the presidential candidate won each congressional district in each state. Finally, they determined
which candidate would win the state-wide Elector of the respective state. Armed with this data, the authors
identified the margins and results of these five elections using the proposed MNM and PEM accounting. Once they
determined how many Electors would be awarded to each candidate using each of the three manners, the authors
converted those whole numbers into percentages in order to compare them for our accuracy metrics.
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For this test, the authors found the margin of victory in the NPV. Then, the predicted margin of victory of each
manner was calculated and measured to determine the difference between the two. For example, in 2008, Obama
won 53.4% of the NPV; McCain won 46.%. See infra app. C. Therefore, the margin of victory for 2008 is 7.3.
Using the WTA accounting, Obama won 67.9% of the Electors, and McCain won 32.2% of the Electors, creating a
margin of 35.7. The difference between the NPV margin of victory and WTA accounting is 28.4 points.
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Finding the margin of victory in each state by congressional district, predicted the margin of victory of each
manner, and then measured the difference between the two.
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and (3) the winner based on statewide elections.205 After determining which manner was the
most and least accurate in every year, each manner was ranked and calculated determining the
average of each manner over the past five elections.206
1. PEM BEST COMPORTS WITH THE FRAMERS’ PRIORITIES FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Looking to the five principles by which the Framers weighed the proposed modes of
presidential selection, the PEM most closely conforms to their values and prevents the ills they
were meant to cure. The PEM eliminates the modern faction of battleground states, making 73%
of states able to award Electors to Democratic and Republican candidates.207 Proportional
appointment of Electors would render battleground states more resistant to popular excitement
and demagogues by disallowing the consolidation of electoral support. The use of the PEM also
subsequently breaks down the political capital of battleground states, ensuring greater
independence of the Executive. At worst, the electorate’s increased knowledge of candidates
treats WTAs, PEM, and MNM equally. Finally, the will of the people would be more clearly
represented by the PEM’s superior accuracy to other acceptable manner.208
2. PEM IS MOST ACCURATE REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
In calculating the accuracy of each manner to the NPV, PEM is the clear winner, winning
13 points.209 WTA came in second with nine points, with MNM closely behind with eight.210
Arguably, the most interesting pattern detected is that of the past three elections. In those
elections, the rank of each manner is unchanged: PEM was the most accurate, departing no more
than five points from the NPV.211 WTA was the least accurate, with 16 points being its closest
difference, and 28 points being its largest.212 On average, the ranking system proves that the
PEM is the most accurate in reflecting the popular vote.
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There is no clear winner when calculating the accuracy of each manner compared to the
percentage of congressional districts won by each candidate. MNM and PEM are tied, with
WTA as the clear loser.213 It is not surprising that the MNM performed well in predicting the
percentage of congressional districts won; after all, that is its primary function.214 What is
surprising is that PEM is equally accurate as MNM in reflecting the interest of congressional
district votes.
Determining the margin of victory between the states as a whole is not a useful
measurement for two distinct reasons. First, regardless of which manner of accounting the Statewide Electors used, the accounting would be the same for each approach. Second, the
importance of the Statewide Elector seemed to change according to party. Looking at the last
five elections, Republican victory occurred only when 59%-61% of states voted for the GOP.215
Democrat Barack Obama was able to win in 2008 with 57% of states, and in 2012 with 51% of
states.216 Ultimately, because the statewide distribution of Electors would be the same in each
manner, the analysis used only the two previously mentioned metrics.
The data and ranking analysis revealed a clear winner and a clear loser when comparing
the three manners. PEM is the most accurate in reflecting the NPV, and equally accurate in
predicting congressional district margins.217 In both of these categories, the WTA is the least
accurate.218 Additionally, in analyzing the various elections, a troubling pattern emerged when
the MNM was calculated for every state.
The 2000 and 2016 elections joined the notorious ranks of the three other presidential
elections where the preference of the popular vote was not the preference of the Electoral
College.219 By calculating the results of the election under the NPV, MNM, and PEM, PEM
accurately predicts and explains the outcomes of the 2000 and 2016 elections.
In 2016, the final NPV reflected 48.9% of the vote for Clinton and 46.7% of the vote for
Trump.220 However, WTAs did not reflect how close the race it was, with 42.2% of Electors
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voting for Hillary Clinton and 56.5% for Donald Trump.221 The most troubling characteristic of
the Electoral College is how a two-point NPV victory for Clinton can translate into a fourteenpoint defeat once the votes are calculated using WTA.222 MNM’s accounting comes closer,
awarding 45.72% of Electors to Clinton and 54.28% to Trump.223 But MNM still suffered from
a fatal flaw: the popular vote preferred Clinton. The question is evident: How did Trump win?
The answer: He won more states—61% to Clinton’s 39%.224 By using the PEM, it
becomes evident that District Electors would have reflected the preference of the nation quite
accurately. In 2016, we see the importance of the so-called “small-state bias”: 39% of states
supported Clinton but 61% of states voted for Trump, we see the importance of the so-called
“small-state bias.”225 Even with a relatively narrow margin of the popular vote favoring Clinton,
far more states preferred Trump.226 Trump’s victory in 61% of states resulted in the PEM
determining 48.9% to Clinton and 51.3% to Trump; the closest of the tested manners to the
NPV.227
The story of the 2000 election is relatively similar. There, George Bush received 48.2%
of the NPV, while Al Gore received 48.7%.228 Much like 2016, when the margins were narrow,
the “small state bias” was particularly relevant. Indeed, in 2000, Bush won 59% of the states to
Gore’s 41%, securing Bush a victory via the Electoral College.229 It is worth noting that this
“small state bias” is not exclusive to Republicans; in 2008, Barack Obama won 57% of the states
to John McCain’s 43%.230 However in 2012, Obama was able to secure a victory over Mitt
Romney by narrowly securing 53% of states to Romney’s 47%.231
Ultimately, PEM is the most accurate accounting method due to its proportional
accounting of a state’s popular vote and its minor exaggeration of the statewide bias. It serves to
not only balance the interest of the people, but the interest of the states as entities. By not
restricting the assignment of Electors to possibly-gerrymandered congressional districts, PEM
fairly gauges the support of a candidate both within a state and amongst the nation.
C. PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES
For just a moment, let us theorize what the effects of implementing PEM could be. First
and foremost, we see that the Electoral College, by a number of different metrics, would more
221

See infra app. E. Translated to percentages, the Electoral college went 42.2% for the Democrat, and 56.5% for
the Republican. Infra app. E.
222

See infra app. E.

223

See infra app. E.

224

See infra app. E.

225

See infra app. E.

226

See infra app. E.

227

See infra app. E.

228

See infra app. A.

229

See infra app. A.

230

See infra app. C.

231

See infra app. D.

34

A MORE PERFECT ELECTORAL COLLEGE

closely resemble the preferred candidate. While the accounting may be more accurate, the result
of the last three elections would be exactly the same. But what could be the consequences?
1. THE PEM WOULD GIVE A VOICE TO THE MARGINALIZED AND UNHEARD
In 2016, two thirds of the presidential campaigns were concentrated in just six states.232
Indeed, PEM would not substantially alter the importance of the battleground states; Florida,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would continue to be hotly contested. But take reliably
Democratic, and largely ignored California. For decades, Democrats could count on the states
formidable fifty-five electoral votes to bring the Democratic hopeful a fifth of their way to
victory.233 However, using PEM, only 37 of the Electors would have been awarded to
Democrats in 2016, and 17 would have fell to Republicans.234 The story is the same for reliably
Republican Texas, splitting that state with fifteen votes to Democrats, and twenty-three to
Republicans.235 These results in both Democratic and Republican states demonstrate that PEM
favors no political party. Further, the minority party in those electoral giants would be given a
voice; effective participation in the presidential electoral process.236 Minority votes in majority
controlled states would finally be obtainable, and candidates would be forced to hear and
respond to those voters concerns, or risk losing their votes.
The story is the same throughout the country. WTAs naturally ignore the issues
concerning most voters in spectator states, as the support of the state is a foregone conclusion.
However, under PEM, 73% of the states could be considered “in play,” meaning that presidential
candidates would be forced to adjust their political agenda to appeal to a much wider national
audience.237 In doing so, the bitter and marginalized “issue politics” that burden our system
could give way to a fascinating alternative. Under PEM, nuanced and complicated approaches
would be necessary to win the support of votes. With enough moderate concerns in the
forefront, the prevailing decider of our elections may not be issues at all, but the virtue, charisma,
and leadership of the candidates for our country. Indeed, the selection of the most virtuous to
lead us was the future that the Framers so desperately wanted.238
2. PEM WOULD NATURALLY REGULATE SPECIAL INTEREST SPENDING
Political spending continues to be a major point of contention within our political
process. There are numerous challenges in tracking the spending on a candidate by PACs and
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special interest groups.239 However, in analyzing where candidates spend their money, two
valuable conclusions become apparent.
First, political spending, just like campaign activity, is currently limited to a small group
of battleground states.240 In the crucial weeks leading up to the 2016 general election, Trump’s
spending in Wisconsin, later proven critical to his victory, exceeded $2.4 million.241 Florida saw
about $18.8 million for Clinton, and $10.4 Million for Trump. New Hampshire, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Colorado, and Nevada saw similar spending. Compare all of these to the
$8.2 million spent for national ads by Clinton, and the $6.9 million spent nationally for
Trump.242
However, what if the collective $103.2 million dollars in media spending, rather than
being concentrated in eleven battleground states, were spent in the thirty-six that would have
valuable electoral votes for both parties? By forcing candidates to spread their advertising at risk
of ostracizing classic “safe” states, PEM would essentially depreciate the value of the political
dollar. This could result in three scenarios. First, the power of the wealthy to control political
elections through large donations would be diluted amongst more states, resulting in a more
meaningful discussion of a wider array of issues. Second, with less concentrated capital, it
would likely result in increased volunteer participation in political campaigns, increasing the
meaningful discourse between voters rather than just listening to soundbites and divisive political
attacks. Third, it would undoubtedly energize voters in otherwise “safe” states to register to vote
and involve themselves in the political process. Any of these three predictions would translate to
a more honest and meaningful democratic involvement in our political system. These are
undoubtedly the values that the Constitution always meant to propagate to make our union more
perfect.
For these reasons, we believe that the Supreme Court review of WTAs is not only
necessary, but inevitable. While the Framers’ intent may be used to shed light on the
constitutionality of an issue, it is not a per se cause of action. However opposed WTAs may be
to the principles upon which the Framers relied, WTAs raise both historical and modern
constitutional issues under the Twelfth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
While the public may not trust the Electoral College, it cannot be forgotten that its use is
mandated by the strictures of our Constitution. WTAs, however, are not creatures of the
Constitution; they are creatures of statute. This Article asserts that is it not the Electoral College
that so troubles the body politic; it is simply how the college is counted.
Most importantly, the concept of proportional representation for a presidential election is
neither novel nor unused. Indeed, it is a concept utilized by the Democratic Party for the benefit
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of their own party members to create “fair representation” in the nominating process.243 In 1968,
the Democratic party nominated Hubert Humphry as its candidate for President despite his
failure to participate in a single primary election.244 In response, the Democrats passed the
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, which overturned the “unit rule,” which
was a winner-takes-all provision that previously gave the winner of the convention all of the
party’s support.245 The Commission was designed to create “fair representation” in the
nominating process, and to ensure—not unlike the Twelfth Amendment—that minority factions
could not use procedural rules to supplant the will of the voters.246 The Republican party’s
opposition to proportional representation is dug deep into the culture of the party.247 Regardless,
proportional representation appears to be the forward motion of our electoral process, with
WTAs simply standing in the way.
At its simplest, concentrating the outcome of the Presidential election in few states draws
the frustration of the rest. In the end, the solution itself seems simple. By eliminating WTAs, we
may take a step towards every voter waking on Wednesday morning after the presidential
election, knowing that they have been heard, and they have been counted. In the history of the
United States, the process of presidential selection has been a journey of change and adjustment.
These changes to the Constitution were central to the idea, born with our country, that the Union
itself will never be perfect. Eliminating WTAs builds upon the fair representation model and the
political courage from the states of Maine and Nebraska whose increased political importance is
on display for the rest of the country to emulate. This forward thinking of the electoral process
is necessary as we may, once again, strive to become more perfect.
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